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THE PROBLEM OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN
K-12 SCHOOLS
Sarah Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
When thirteen-year-old Savana Redding arrived at school
one autumn day in 2003, she was not expecting to be pulled out
of her math class and strip searched.1 But, that is exactly what
happened after the assistant principal suspected her of possessing
and distributing “prescription-strength ibuprofen” and “over-thecounter . . . naproxen” after receiving information from another
student.2 After Savana consented to a search of her backpack and
other belongings—a search which turned up no evidence of drug
possession—the assistant principal asked the school nurse and
administrative assistant to search Savana’s clothes.3 To do this,
the school officials asked Savana “to remove her jacket, socks,
and shoes,” followed by her pants and shirt.4 As if this was not
enough, they then told Savana “to pull her bra out to the side and
shake it, and to pull out the elastic of her underpants, thus
exposing her breasts and pelvic area . . . .”5 Ultimately, the school

*
J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. Articles Editor for the
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author sincerely thanks Professor Danielle
Weatherby for her help, advice, and support throughout the writing process. The author also
thanks Gray Norton for her invaluable encouragement and advice and the entire Arkansas
Law Review staff, especially Caleb Epperson, for the countless hours they spent cite checking
and editing. Finally, the author also gives a special thank you to her mother, father, and
brothers for their encouragement and support throughout the writing process and her entire
law school career.
1. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009).
2. Id. That student, Marissa, was also subjected to a strip search before the school
officials’ search of Savana, during which the school did not find any pills. Id. at 373.
3. Id. at 368-69.
4. Id. at 369.
5. Redding, 557 U.S. at 369.
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officials did not find any pills after the “embarrassing,
frightening, and humiliating” strip search.6
In response to the strip search, Savana’s mother filed suit
against the school, the assistant principal, the administrative
assistant, and the school nurse for violating Savana’s Fourth
Amendment rights.7 The case made it to the Supreme Court,
which found that although the strip search violated Savana’s
Fourth Amendment rights, qualified immunity protected the
school officials from liability because the law surrounding school
strip searches was not “sufficiently clear.”8 This is the most
recent Supreme Court case that addresses qualified immunity’s
application to public school officials.
However, numerous lower courts have also held that
qualified immunity protected school officials in cases with other
forms of egregious conduct against students.9 Lower courts’
applications of qualified immunity as a shield for school
personnel have created a problem for students and their parents
who attempt to sue school officials for wrongful conduct but are
barred because of the doctrine’s broad application.10 This
Comment argues that the Supreme Court should abolish qualified
immunity in Section 1983 cases, which enables private
individuals to sue government actors for civil rights violations,11
against public school officials.

6. Id. at 369, 374-75.
7. Id. at 369.
8. Id. at 378-79.
9. See, e.g., Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 951-52 (11th Cir. 2003)
(teacher entitled to qualified immunity after performing strip searches of fifth grade students
after twenty-six dollars disappeared from the teacher’s desk); Harris v. Robinson, 273 F.3d
927, 929, 931 (10th Cir. 2001) (teacher entitled to qualified immunity after making student
clean out a toilet with his bare hands); Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1025-26, 1033
(8th Cir. 1996) (school district and physical therapist entitled to qualified immunity after
using a blanket wrapping technique to restrain a mentally and physically disabled student for
over one hour, allowing flies to enter the student’s nose and mouth); Hagan v. Hous. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 48, 50, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1995) (school principal entitled to qualified
immunity after failing to sufficiently respond to complaints of sexual molestation by a coach
even though he failed to follow the steps for handling sexual abuse complaints in the school
handbook).
10. See Amanda Harmon Cooley, An Efficacy Examination and Constitutional
Critique of School Shaming, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 345 (2018).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The modern-day application of the doctrine, particularly
how courts view and apply the “clearly established” prong, allows
school officials to escape liability for egregious acts against
students. Indeed, courts applying the “clearly established” prong
require the facts in a particular case to be strikingly similar,
substantially similar, or nearly identical to a previous case that “a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates” the constitutional right at issue.12 If the Supreme Court
rejected qualified immunity for public school officials, students
would have a greater chance of winning their Section 1983
claims.
In the absence of qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense for school officials, courts should evaluate claims against
these officials based on the nature of the claimed injury, applying
existing standards. First, courts should continue to evaluate
claims for Fourth Amendment violations through the New Jersey
v. T.L.O. standard for school searches13 and the Ingraham v.
Wright standard for corporal punishment.14 Second, regarding
Fourteenth Amendment violations, courts should continue to use
the already burdensome “shocks-the-conscience” test for
substantive Due Process violations.15 Third, concerning First
Amendment violations, courts should continue to apply
heightened scrutiny, based on the quartet of Supreme Court cases
that govern issues implicating student speech rights.16
To be clear, practically, these standards already govern a
student’s Section 1983 claim after it survives the defendant’s
dispositive motion grounded in qualified immunity. However,
this Comment argues that the Supreme Court should reject
qualified immunity in these cases because it has been an
additional barrier for vindications of students’ constitutional
rights. Relying on these standards alone, without the interference
12. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
13. 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
14. 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
15. See Lewis M. Wasserman, Students’ Freedom From Excessive Force by Public
School Officials: A Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment Right?, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
35, 51-61 (2011).
16. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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of the qualified immunity defense, will more effectively balance
vindication of student rights with school officials’ discretion to
control the learning environment.17 The existing standards also
provide adequate notice to school officials about what behaviors
are and are not permissible when performing their job duties
because they are sufficiently clear to define the contours of the
implicated constitutional rights.18
This Comment includes four parts. Part II explains the
doctrine of qualified immunity and its policy justifications and
summarizes other protections for school officials to defend
against Section 1983 claims. It then argues that the modern
application of qualified immunity is inappropriate in the K-12
public school context because it fails to support the Supreme
Court’s policy justifications for the doctrine. Part III analyzes the
existing legal standards and structures that should continue to
inform courts’ evaluations of students’ claims for constitutional
violations against school officials. This Part lays out the T.L.O.
standard for Fourth Amendment claims for unreasonable
searches, describes the burdensome “shocks-the-conscience” test
for Fourteenth Amendment excessive punishment claims, and
explains how First Amendment claims for violations of student
speech are analyzed under heightened scrutiny. Part IV considers
the implications of abolishing qualified immunity for public
school officials and relying on the existing legal standards alone
to evaluate students’ Section 1983 claims.
In conclusion, this Comment suggests that abolishing
qualified immunity as a defense for K-12 public school officials
will respect the policy justifications of qualified immunity while
providing an avenue for more successful student claims asserted
against school officials under Section 1983. Allowing traditional
legal standards alone to guide students’ Section 1983 claims will
effectively balance public and private interests by securing
greater protections for students’ constitutional rights, shielding
school officials from financial liability where appropriate,
providing adequate notice of the types of conduct that violate

17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Parts III-IV.
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constitutional protections, and respecting school officials’
discretion to perform their duties as educators.19
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND OTHER
PROTECTIONS
To fully understand why the modern application of the
doctrine of qualified immunity has failed in the K-12 public
school context, it is instructive to look at how the doctrine began
and how it has evolved in the Supreme Court. This Part traces the
Supreme Court’s introduction of the doctrine in the public school
context, its subsequent transformation to its modern iteration, and
scholars’ support of the doctrine. It then discusses other
protections that are available to public school officials and
districts when students bring Section 1983 claims for violations
of their constitutional rights. This Part concludes with a
discussion of why courts’ modern applications of qualified
immunity are inappropriate in the K-12 context.
A. Qualified Immunity
The main statutory mechanism for students to vindicate their
constitutional rights in claims against teachers is 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which provides that anyone who, “under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia,” deprives another “of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”20 Although
written broadly, Section 1983 has its limits, including several
immunities for government officials.21 Courts have traditionally
19. Courts’ applications of qualified immunity are problematic in all areas, not just K12 public schools. However, it is important to focus on qualified immunity in the school
context because schools are charged with the important task of “educating the young for
citizenship[, which] is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). Thus, this Comment is limited to qualified immunity in the K-12
public school context.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
21. David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can New Jersey
v. T.L.O. Solve the Problem?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1994).
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allowed school officials to raise qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense against claims of civil rights violations.22
Qualified immunity is a “judicial construct”23 created because the
Supreme Court determined “that an individual’s right to
compensation for constitutional violations and the deterrence of
unconstitutional conduct should be subordinated to the
governmental interest in effective and vigorous execution of
governmental policies and programs.”24
The Supreme Court first addressed qualified immunity’s
application to school officials in Wood v. Strickland.25 In that
case, Arkansas high school students brought a Section 1983
action against two school administrators, claiming that the
administrators violated their Due Process rights when they
expelled the students for possessing and consuming alcohol at an
extracurricular meeting in violation of a school regulation.26 The
Court held:
[A] school board member is not immune from liability for
damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury to the student.27

The Wood Court based this holding on the principle that “the
school disciplinary process . . . necessarily involves the exercise
of discretion . . .” and reasoned that denying immunity to school
officials “would contribute not to principled and fearless
decision-making but to intimidation.”28
The Court modified its Wood holding in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, which introduced the modern qualified immunity
22. Id. at 20; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
23. Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 21. But see Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J.
Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1858
(2018) (arguing that qualified immunity is “an unquestioned principle of American statutory
law”).
24. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 36 (1989).
25. 420 U.S. 308, 318-22 (1975).
26. Id. at 309-11.
27. Id. at 322.
28. Id. at 319 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
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doctrine.29 Although Harlow involved presidential aides rather
than school officials, it introduced the current qualified immunity
defense school officials raise in response to claims of
constitutional violations.30 Justice Powell noted that the Wood
holding involved both an objective component and a subjective
component but found the subjective component created
“substantial costs” in the litigation of whether the government
officials acted in good faith in carrying out their duties.31 In
response, the Court articulated a new test for the application of
the qualified immunity doctrine: “government officials
performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”32 The new test wholly
eliminated the subjective component articulated in Wood and
reworked the objective component to include the “clearly
established” language on which courts rely so heavily today.33
Anderson v. Creighton further expanded the protection
granted to government officials under the qualified immunity
doctrine.34 In that case, an F.B.I. agent conducted a warrantless
search of a family while pursuing the suspect of a bank robbery.35
Justice Scalia explained that “if the test of ‘clearly established
law’ were to be applied” too generally, “it would bear no
relationship to the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ that is the
touchstone of Harlow.”36 Thus, he clarified that “[t]he contours
of the [constitutional] right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.”37 Under this rule, it is substantially easier for
government officials, including public school officials, to avoid
liability.38
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Id. at 802.
Id. at 815-16.
Id. at 818.
Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 22; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640.
Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 23.
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Pearson v. Callahan is another important qualified
immunity decision.39 In that case, “state law enforcement officers
. . . conducted a warrantless search of [the respondent’s] house
incident to his arrest for the sale of methamphetamine to an
undercover informant . . . .”40 The Court overturned its previous
ruling in Saucier v. Katz which required courts first to determine
“whether ‘the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right’” and then to decide “whether the right was
clearly established.”41 The Court in Pearson held that “[t]he
judges of the district courts and courts of appeals should be
permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which
[one] of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should
be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
case at hand.”42 Following this decision, many courts have failed
to reach the first prong (i.e., “whether the conduct violated a
constitutional right”) and have focused solely on the “clearly
established” prong of qualified immunity.43
As discussed in Part I, the most recent Supreme Court case
applying qualified immunity to school officials is Safford Unified
School District No. 1 v. Redding.44 The Court held that a school
principal was entitled to qualified immunity after he strip
searched a thirteen-year-old girl because he suspected her of
bringing prescription-strength ibuprofen and over-the-counter
naproxen to school.45 While the Court did not spend much of its
opinion discussing qualified immunity, it found that even though
the principal’s search of the student’s bra and underwear was
unreasonable, the law surrounding school strip searches was
unclear.46 Therefore, the principal was not expected to know that
his conduct would violate the student’s Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches.47 This decision renewed
39. 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 232 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
42. Id. at 236.
43. Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting “All but the Plainly Incompetent”
(and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2012).
44. 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 378-79.
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the debate over the legality of strip searches in schools and
whether qualified immunity should protect public school
administrators and teachers in these situations.48
The Supreme Court has articulated several policy
justifications for its creation of and reliance on the qualified
immunity doctrine.49 In Pearson, the Court stated that qualified
immunity was necessary to balance “the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably.”50 The Supreme
Court in Harlow also pointed to the doctrine’s protection against
(1) “the expenses of litigation,” (2) “the diversion of official
energy from pressing public issues,” (3) “the deterrence of able
citizens from acceptance of public office,” and (4) “the danger
that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties’” as important policy
justifications for the doctrine.51 In United States v. Lanier, the
Court explained that “qualified immunity seeks to ensure that
defendants ‘reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may
give rise to liability,’” meaning that public officials need to have
“fair warning” that their conduct would violate an individual’s
constitutional rights to be held liable for their actions.52 A more
recent justification for the doctrine is to reduce the “burdens
48. See Ryan E. Thomas, Comment, Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding:
Qualified Immunity Shields School Officials Who Ordered Strip-Search of Thirteen-YearOld Girl, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 267, 275 (2010); Eric W. Clarke, Note, Safford Unified
School District #1 v. Redding: Why Qualified Immunity is a Poor Fit in Fourth Amendment
School Search Cases, 24 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 313, 324-26 (2010); Thomas R. Hooks, Comment,
A Rock, a Hard Place, and a Reasonable Suspicion: How the United States Supreme Court
Stripped School Officials of the Authority to Keep Students Safe, 71 LA. L. REV. 269, 26970 (2010).
49. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J.
2, 13-16, 58-76 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails]; Alan K. Chen,
The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 236-37 (2006).
50. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
51. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
52. 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984));
see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 741 (2002) (explaining that “qualified immunity
operates ‘to ensure that before they are subject to suit, officers are on notice that their conduct
is unlawful’”) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
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associated with discovery and trial” for public officials.53 In the
public school setting, the Supreme Court has placed heavy
emphasis on qualified immunity’s protection of school officials’
discretion in disciplining and protecting students.54
B. Other Protections
Aside from qualified immunity, public school teachers and
districts are afforded other protections against claims for civil
rights violations. One of these is the lack of a school’s legal duty
to protect its students under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive Due Process right.55 According to the Supreme Court
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private
violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause.”56 Therefore, school officials cannot be liable for private
actors’ actions against students while attending school under the
traditional rule.57
However, “courts have recognized two exceptions to this
rule: (1) the special relationship theory and (2) the state-created
danger doctrine.”58 The special relationship theory states that “a
special relationship exists, imposing an affirmative duty to
protect, only when a state entity confines a person in its custody
against her will, rendering that person unable to care for
herself.”59 Notably, the Supreme Court has not recognized that a
special relationship exists between students and their schools or
teachers, and even though states have “compulsory education
laws,” several circuit courts have determined that these laws do
not create a special relationship between schools and their
students that would establish a duty to protect the students.60 The
53. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 49, at 9.
54. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975).
55. Danielle Weatherby, Opening the “Snake Pit”: Arming Teachers in the War
Against School Violence and the Government-Created Risk Doctrine, 48 CONN. L. REV. 119,
130 (2015).
56. 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
57. Weatherby, supra note 55, at 130.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 132.
60. Id.
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lack of a special relationship between schools and their students
means that student plaintiffs may not assert a heightened duty of
care when bringing claims against teachers.61
Further, the state-created danger doctrine provides a very
narrow exception to the no-duty rule if the “harms . . . are brought
onto campus by the school itself or its employees.”62 This
doctrine only applies in limited circumstances, however, so it
alone is insufficient to enable student claims against school
officials, especially since qualified immunity poses an additional
barrier.63 Therefore, school officials can avoid liability for certain
civil rights violations because of a lack of special relationship
between schools and their students or if the school itself did not
create the danger.
The Supreme Court has also afforded school boards and
districts protection under the extremely stringent standard
articulated in Monell v. Department of Social Services.64 Under
this standard, “when execution of a government’s policy or
custom . . . inflicts the injury, . . . the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983.”65 A Monell claim involves two
elements.66 First, a state actor (i.e., public school official) must
have “violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”67 Second, the
school must be responsible for the violation because its policy,
practice, or custom was the “‘moving force’ of the deprivation of
the plaintiff’s federal rights.”68 Further, the plaintiff must show
the school, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences,
established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which
directly caused [the plaintiff] constitutional harm.”69 Because the
deliberate indifference standard sets such a high bar for plaintiffs,
it offers substantial protection to school districts, even when an
61. See id. at 133.
62. Weatherby, supra note 55, at 135.
63. Id. at 135-36 (listing the elements required for a plaintiff to rely on the state-created
danger doctrine).
64. 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978).
65. Id. at 694.
66. Weatherby, supra note 55, at 160.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 161 (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 400 (1997)).
69. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1988).
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individual teacher or administrator is liable for a constitutional
violation.
C. Why Qualified Immunity is Inappropriate in
K-12 Public Schools
In response to the Supreme Court’s policy justifications for
qualified immunity, several scholars have advanced significant
criticisms of the qualified immunity doctrine.70 Although many
of these criticisms arise in the context of the doctrine’s application
to law enforcement officers, they are still relevant to the
doctrine’s application to school officials.
Professor Joanna Schwartz has advanced several arguments
against the doctrine.71 She first argues that “qualified immunity
has no basis in the common law.”72 In Pierson v. Ray, the
Supreme Court claimed that the qualified immunity defense
should be available to government officials because there was a
“good faith and probable cause” defense available for “commonlaw action[s] for false arrest and imprisonment.”73 Professor
Schwartz argues that because there was no “good faith defense to
liability” to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 which initially enacted
Section 1983, the Supreme Court’s claim in Pierson is not
accurate.74 Even if the Supreme Court was correct about qualified
immunity’s basis in the common law, its modern application of
the doctrine undermines this claim because the Court “eliminated
consideration of officers’ subjective intent and instead focused on
whether officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.”75
Consequently, even if “a plaintiff can demonstrate that a
defendant was acting in bad faith, that evidence is considered
irrelevant to the qualified immunity analysis.”76
70. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified
Immunity]; Bendlin, supra note 43, at 1040; Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified
Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil
Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126 (1985).
71. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1801-32.
72. Id. at 1801-02.
73. 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967).
74. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1801.
75. Id. at 1802.
76. Id.
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Professor Schwartz further claims that the doctrine does not
actually advance the policy goals articulated in Harlow, in part
because qualified immunity “does not shield officers from
financial burdens.”77 In her six-year study of law enforcement
officers, she found that “[i]n the vast majority of jurisdictions,
‘officers are more likely to be struck by lightning’ than to
contribute to a settlement or judgment over the course of their
career” because of state laws either requiring or allowing
municipalities to indemnify officers in Section 1983 cases.78 This
argument also applies in the K-12 context because school boards
or districts often “have a statutory duty to hold . . . teacher[s]
harmless from financial loss and expense, including legal fees”
for Section 1983 claims or reimburse school officials “for legal
expenses incurred with respect to his or her duties.”79 Although
one of the main policy justifications for qualified immunity is to
protect government officials from “the expenses of litigation,”
these statutes that authorize teacher indemnification already
provide that protection, rendering qualified immunity
unnecessary to shield school officials from financial burdens.80
Further, Professor Schwartz argues that the doctrine “does
not protect against overdeterrence.”81 One of the main policy
objectives of qualified immunity articulated in Harlow was to
prevent “the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public
officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’”82
However, Professor Schwartz notes that “law enforcement
officers infrequently think about the threat of being sued when
performing their jobs.”83 She also argues that any difficulty in
recruiting police officers is due to “high-profile shootings,
77. Id. at 1804-08, 1813-14.
78. Id. at 1806 (quoting Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 885, 914 (2014)).
79. 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 460 (2021); see also Aaron L. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, Qualified Immunity and Federalism, 109 GEO. L.J. 229, 269-74
(2020).
80. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
81. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1811.
82. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949)).
83. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1811.
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negative publicity about the police, strained relationships with
communities of color, tight budgets, low unemployment rates,
and the reduction of retirement benefits.”84 There has also been
an increased shortage of teachers in the past several years, largely
due to inadequate salaries, “the repeated refrain that US schools
are failing and terrible,” “loss of professional autonomy,” and the
sentiment that teaching is so easy that anyone can do it.85 It is
unlikely that the elimination of qualified immunity would deter
individuals from working in public schools any more than other
factors already do.
Qualified immunity also does not further the policy objective
of providing government officials notice that specific kinds of
conduct may violate individuals’ constitutional rights.86 This is
largely because of “[t]he challenge of identifying clearly
established law.”87 Professor Schwartz notes that “the Supreme
Court’s qualified immunity decisions require that the prior
precedent clearly establishing the law have facts exceedingly
similar to those in the instant case.”88 The Court has stated that
“‘clearly established law’ should not be defined at a high level of
generality.”89 However, by requiring such close factual similarity
between cases, “Supreme Court precedent [may be] the only
surefire way to clearly establish the law.”90 When the Supreme
Court’s Pearson decision allowed lower courts to evade the
constitutional violation issue if they found that no clearlyestablished right existed in a particular case, it created a “vicious
cycle” in which courts grant qualified immunity without ruling on
the underlying constitutional claim, thus not “clearly
establish[ing]” the law.91
This resulting “constitutional
stagnation” only creates more “confusion about the scope of
constitutional rights” and makes it extremely difficult for
84. Id. at 1813.
85. Peter Greene, We Need to Stop Talking About the Teacher Shortage, FORBES (Sept.
5, 2019, 8:35 PM), [https://perma.cc/A6PB-XTTM].
86. See Jacob Heller, Abominable Acts, 34 VT. L. REV. 311, 316-17 (2009).
87. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 1814-15.
88. Id. at 1815.
89. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)) (internal quotations
omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1815-16.
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plaintiffs to bring successful claims for constitutional violations
under Section 1983.92
The above criticisms of qualified immunity are concerning
in the public school context.93 Further, there are other protections
that courts have afforded to school officials that still allow
teachers and administrators to exercise discretion in their job
duties.94 The modern application of qualified immunity in the K12 context is inappropriate because it protects school officials’
egregious conduct. The Supreme Court should abolish the
doctrine’s use in cases against public school officials and instead
should simply rely on existing legal standards for students’ claims
of constitutional violations. Courts should continue to use the
T.L.O. standard for school searches95 and the Ingraham standard
for corporal punishment to evaluate Section 1983 claims based on
the Fourth Amendment.96 Concerning Fourteenth Amendment
claims, courts should continue to rely on the burdensome
“shocks-the-conscience” test for substantive Due Process
violations.97 Lastly, courts should continue to evaluate claims for
First Amendment violations under heightened scrutiny, based on
previous Supreme Court decisions analyzing students’ claims for
First Amendment violations.98 These modes of analysis are
sufficiently clear as to provide notice to school personnel about
what actions may or may not impermissibly violate students’
constitutional rights. Relying on these standards without
allowing school officials to raise a qualified immunity defense
will also further clarify the law, which will allow school officials

92. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2015); Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM.
L. REV. 309, 318 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity]; see also Bendlin,
supra note 43, at 1040, 1047-48 (arguing that the modern application of qualified immunity
allows courts to skip the constitutional question, thus “leav[ing] an allegedly unclear area of
law entirely unsettled, and the state officials remain uncertain whether their actions will
violate someone else’s constitutional rights”).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 70-92.
94. See supra Section II.B.
95. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
96. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
97. See Wasserman, supra note 15, at 51-61.
98. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
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to have even more adequate notice of what kinds of conduct may
or may not be unlawful.
Abolishing qualified immunity will provide more
protections for students’ constitutional rights while still
preserving the policy justifications that qualified immunity was
designed to serve. Recognizing that existing legal standards
clarify what conduct is permissible and what is impermissible for
school officials in performing their job duties will effectively
balance the need “to hold [school] officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly” with the protection of school
personnel from “harassment, distraction, and liability.”99 Further,
the existing legal standards that put school officials on notice of
what they can and cannot do when performing their duties as
educators continue to provide school personnel with discretion in
controlling the learning environment.100 Overall, abolishing
qualified immunity in the K-12 public school context will enable
more successful student Section 1983 claims while continuing to
permit school officials to perform their job duties without fear of
financial liability.
III. STUDENTS’ CLAIMS
A rejection of the doctrine of qualified immunity would not
mean that students’ Section 1983 claims against school officials
“would imperil individual defendants’ pocketbooks and the
government fisc . . . [or] discourage people from accepting”
positions in K-12 public schools.101 Current modes of analysis
that courts use to evaluate students’ constitutional claims are
designed to protect teachers’ discretion in schools so that school
officials can perform their job duties without fear of frivolous
lawsuits or financial liability. This Part will explain the standards
that courts should continue to use to evaluate students’ Section
1983 claims, beginning with claims for bodily injury or violations
of bodily integrity under both the Fourth and Fourteenth

99. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 49, at 8 (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009) (internal quotations omitted)).
100. See infra Part III.
101. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 92, at 315.
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Amendments. It will then discuss students’ claims for violations
of their free speech rights under the First Amendment.
A. Bodily Injury and Violations of Bodily Integrity
Students’ claims for bodily injury or violations of bodily
integrity commonly arise as claims for violations of the Fourth or
Fourteenth Amendments.102 Fourth Amendment claims usually
arise in response to strip searches of students,103 and Fourteenth
Amendment claims commonly result from excessive
punishment.104 This Section will analyze claims under each
amendment separately. It will also argue that these standards—
which courts already use—provide adequate notice to school
officials regarding the lawfulness of their conduct because they
are sufficiently clear in defining the scope of permissible conduct
for school officials performing their job duties.

102. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368-69
(2009) (student’s mother claimed assistant principal and school nurse violated student’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches after nurse strip-searched the
student to look for pills); Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir.
2017) (student claimed high school football coach violated student’s substantive Due Process
rights when student received a traumatic brain injury after coach required the student to
participate in practice after student received a violent hit and coach observed concussion
symptoms); Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 951-52 (11th Cir. 2003) (fifthgrade students claimed teacher violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches after teacher performed strip searches to find missing money);
Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 1996) (disabled student’s parents
claimed school-employed physical therapist violated the student’s substantive Due Process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment after restraining student using a blanket-wrapping
technique for over an hour).
103. See generally Holly Hudelson, Spare the Rod, but a Strip Search is Okay? The
Effect of Qualified Immunity and Allowing a Strip Search in School, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 595
(2010) (discussing how the Redding Court analyzed the student’s Fourth Amendment claim
against assistant principal for strip search); Hooks, supra note 48, at 270, 278-79; Thomas,
supra note 48, at 275-77 n.101; Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 2 n.7.
104. See Carolyn Peri Weiss, Note, Curbing Violence or Teaching It: Criminal
Immunity for Teachers Who Inflict Corporal Punishment, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1251, 1272-73
(1996). However, it is also common for claims of school officials using excessive force
against students to arise under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., J.W. ex rel. Williams v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2018); Preschooler II v. Clark
Cty. Sch. Bd., 479 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Wasserman, supra note 15, at
35-38. For the purposes of this Comment, claims for excessive punishment, including
corporal punishment, will be dealt with under the Fourteenth Amendment analysis because
the majority of courts apply substantive Due Process analyses to these claims. Id. at 35.
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1. Fourth Amendment Claims: Unreasonable Searches
Scholars have noted qualified immunity’s failure to protect
students in cases involving Section 1983 claims for violations of
the Fourth Amendment, particularly in cases involving strip
searches of students by school personnel.105 One reason for the
doctrine’s failure is courts’ misinterpretations or misapplications
of the Supreme Court’s articulation of the law regarding strip
searches of students in T.L.O.106 In that case, a high school
principal searched a student’s purse for cigarettes and drugs.107
Although T.L.O. did not involve strip searches, the Supreme
Court held that school searches are subject to a two-part inquiry
from Terry v. Ohio based on the “reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search.”108 This two-part inquiry requires
courts first to consider “whether the . . . action was justified at its
inception” and then determine whether the search as conducted
“was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.”109 The Court then
continued and stated how the Terry standard should apply in
school search cases:
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a
teacher or other school official[] will be “justified at its
inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.110

In Redding, the Court determined that the law from T.L.O.
was unclear because the Circuits interpreted the law differently
and that these differences were significant enough for the
105. See Hudelson, supra note 103, at 597, 602; Hooks, supra note 48, at 285; Thomas,
supra note 48, at 281; Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 55.
106. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985); see also Thomas, supra note
48, at 275; Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 42-47.
107. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
108. Id. at 341.
109. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
110. Id. at 341-42.
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assistant principal to receive qualified immunity.111 The Court
found that these different interpretations of T.L.O. did not provide
the assistant principal with adequate notice that ordering the strip
search of Savana violated the Fourth Amendment.112 However,
the Court’s failure to clarify the law from T.L.O. has not allowed
the law regarding student searches to become sufficiently clear.
This kind of “circular reasoning” is a common critique of
qualified immunity, even outside cases involving school officials
and students.113
However, two of the dissenters in Redding argued that the
T.L.O. standard outlining reasonable searches of students under
the Fourth Amendment was sufficiently clear to act as a guide for
school officials in determining whether a search of a student was
reasonable.114 First, Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that the
T.L.O. standard was unambiguous, especially regarding strip
searches of students.115 He even stated, “I have long believed that
‘[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a
nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional
rights of some magnitude.’”116 Using the T.L.O. standard, he
would have determined the strip search of Savana “was both more
intrusive and less justified than the search of the student’s purse
in T. L. O.”117 He also noted that “the clarity of a well-established
right should not depend on whether jurists have misread [the
Supreme Court’s] precedent.”118 Justice Ginsburg also argued in
her dissent that T.L.O. “‘clearly established’ the law governing”
the facts in Redding because “it was not reasonable for [the
assistant principal] to believe that the law permitted” his
“abusive” treatment of Savana.119 This demonstrates that, at least
in the eyes of two Supreme Court Justices, the T.L.O. standard is
111.
112.
113.
114.
part).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
part).

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009).
Id.
See Bendlin, supra note 43, at 1040.
Redding, 557 U.S. at 379-82 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Id. at 380.
Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 382 n.5 (1985)).
Id.
Id.
Redding, 557 U.S. at 381-82 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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sufficiently clear to put school officials on notice of what conduct
is and is not permissible when conducting searches of students.
Further, the T.L.O. standard for assessing the reasonableness
of school searches of students preserves discretion for school
officials in performing their daily duties.120 Alysa Koloms notes
that the Supreme Court’s T.L.O. standard “heavily favors the
disciplinary authority of the school administration.”121 In fact,
much of the Court’s reasoning for the reasonableness standard
was to preserve the school’s “freedom to maintain order in the
school . . . .”122 The majority in T.L.O. even stated that the goal
of the reasonableness standard was to “strike the balance between
the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the
school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in
which learning can take place[.]”123 Because the T.L.O. standard
was formulated in part to protect school officials’ discretion in
disciplining students, qualified immunity for public school
personnel is unnecessary to protect their discretion, contrary to
the Court’s suggestion in Wood.124
2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims: Excessive Punishment
The majority of claims for excessive punishment arise as
claims for violations of a student’s substantive Due Process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.125 In the seminal corporal
punishment case, Ingraham, the Supreme Court held “where
school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately
decide to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child
and inflicting appreciable physical pain . . . Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are implicated.”126 However, the
Court failed to extend this to the substantive component of the
120. Alysa B. Koloms, Note, Stripping Down the Reasonableness Standard: The
Problems with Using In Loco Parentis to Define Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights, 39
HOFSTRA L. REV. 169, 189 (2010).
121. Id. at 191.
122. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-342 (1985).
123. Id. at 340.
124. Id.; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975) (holding that “the school
disciplinary process . . . necessarily involves the exercise of discretion . . . .”).
125. Wasserman, supra note 15, at 35.
126. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
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Due Process Clause and expressly rejected the notion that these
claims implicated the Eighth Amendment, leaving lower courts
unsure as to how to deal with excessive or corporal punishment
cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.127
Circuit courts that deal with claims for excessive punishment
as an alleged violation of the student’s substantive Due Process
rights usually rely on Johnson v. Glick, a case from the Second
Circuit that first applied the “shocks-the-conscience” test to these
claims.128 Although that case involved incarcerated persons and
correctional officers rather than students and school officials,
other circuits have extended the Second Circuit’s four-factor test
to students’ claims of excessive force.129 The Glick “shocks-theconscience” test requires courts to:
[L]ook to such factors as the need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm.130

In these cases, the stringent analysis courts use to evaluate
the “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity imposes an
additional barrier to students’ claims.
For example, in
Heidemann v. Rother, a student’s parents brought a claim alleging
a Fourteenth Amendment violation after a school-employed
physical therapist used a blanket wrapping technique to
physically restrain their mentally and physically disabled nineyear-old daughter for over an hour at a time.131 The blanket
wrapping technique bound the student’s body “with a blanket
such that she could not use her arms, legs, or hands.”132 When
the student’s mother found her at the school the first time, the
student had “flies crawling in and around her mouth and nose.”133
The second time her mother found her, the physical therapist had

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 659 n.12; Wasserman, supra note 15, at 54.
481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1033-34; Wasserman, supra note 15, at 56-58.
Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
84 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1026.
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wrapped the student so tightly that her mother could not remove
the blanket without help.134 Shockingly, the Eighth Circuit held
that the physical therapist was entitled to qualified immunity
against the student’s Section 1983 claim because the “treatment
was . . . within the scope of professionally accepted choices” and
was not a “substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards . . . .”135
Had qualified immunity not been available in Heidemann,
the court’s use of the “shocks-the-conscience” test from Glick
would have resulted in the physical therapist’s liability under
Section 1983.136 “[T]he need for the application of force” was
low, if not nonexistent.137 In fact, the facts of Heidemann provide
no evidence that the physical therapist needed to administer the
blanket wrapping technique except for the presence of the
student’s disabilities and the professional judgment of the
physical therapist.138 Therefore, “the relationship between the
need and the amount of force that was used” was disproportionate
because no force was necessary and the restraint of the student—
so tight that her mother could not remove the blanket without
assistance—was excessive.139 Further, “the extent of injury” was
substantial, especially considering the presence of flies in and
around the student’s nose and mouth.140 Moreover, although
there was no evidence that the punishment was inflicted
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm,” it was also not “applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline.”141 Therefore, had qualified immunity not
applied, the nine-year-old student and her family would have been
able to bring a successful claim for a violation of the student’s
substantive Due Process rights under Section 1983.
Courts’ use of the “shocks-the-conscience” test in evaluating
students’ right to be free from excessive punishment without the
interference of a qualified immunity defense would allow
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 1030-31.
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id.
Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1025-26.
Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033; Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1026.
Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033; Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1026.
Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
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students to bring more successful claims for egregious violations
of their substantive Due Process rights while still allowing some
level of discretion for school personnel. The “shocks-theconscience” test is a high bar to clear, leaving much room for
school officials to implement appropriate disciplinary measures
to protect the students and the learning environment. Further, the
use of the “shocks-the-conscience” test will continue to protect
school officials from the fear of frivolous lawsuits interfering
with their ability to perform their jobs. However, for conduct that
is completely outrageous, the “shocks-the-conscience” standard
will still serve to protect students.
This standard will also allow school officials to have “fair
warning” regarding what kinds of conduct are and are not
permissible.142 The “shocks-the-conscience” test is a stringent
standard, one that is based on “our common moral intuitions.”143
One does not have to be a constitutional scholar to recognize that
some conduct is so egregious that it violates an individual’s
constitutional rights.144 The “shocks-the-conscience” standard
reflects that sentiment and informs public officials that some
conduct is so horrible that it cannot possibly pass constitutional
muster, even without the protection of qualified immunity.
B. First Amendment Violations
The qualified immunity defense is also frequently raised in
students’ claims against school officials for violations of their
First Amendment rights.145 However, it often creates an
142. Heller, supra note 86, at 320.
143. Id. at 356.
144. See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 583, 662 (1998) (arguing that some conduct “contains indicia of its own
blameworthiness”).
145. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 338-39 (2d Cir. 2011) (school
administrators entitled to qualified immunity when student brought claim for violation of her
First Amendment free speech rights after preventing her from running for student
government because of her off-campus speech and prohibiting her from wearing a
homemade printed t-shirt at a school assembly); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 364-65
(5th Cir. 2011) (principal entitled to qualified immunity when student brought a claim for
violation of her First Amendment rights after he restricted her from distributing religious
materials outside of school hours to a group of students); C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2011) (teacher entitled to qualified immunity
after student claimed teacher violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
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additional obstacle for students who bring claims against school
officials under Section 1983 for First Amendment violations.146
In fact, the Second Circuit noted that “[t]he law governing
restrictions on student speech can be difficult and confusing, even
for lawyers, law professors, and judges. The relevant Supreme
Court cases can be hard to reconcile, and courts often struggle to
determine which standard applies in any particular case.”147 One
First Amendment scholar notes that the Pearson Court’s decision
to allow courts to skip the analysis of whether there was a
constitutional violation and directly determine whether the right
was clearly established posed serious problems for student
speech.148 In particular, he argued that “[t]he Pearson decision
gives judges the discretion to avoid tough constitutional questions
and decide cases based on the ‘clearly established’ prong . . . .”149
Because of this problem, another argument is that “First
Amendment values and constitutional values in general would be
better served by an approach that obliges courts to decide
constitutional questions.”150 Abolishing qualified immunity
would allow courts to rule on these constitutional issues without
dealing with the stringent “clearly established” standard that
requires extreme factual similarity to find that the right was
“clearly established” at the time of the school officials’ conduct.
The traditional standard for analyzing student speech under
the First Amendment comes from Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.151 In that case, the
when teacher made statements hostile to religion while discussing creationism in history
class); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1259, 1265, 1269 (11th Cir.
2004) (teacher and principal not entitled to qualified immunity when student brought claim
for violation of his First Amendment free speech rights after school officials paddled student
for raising his fist during a daily flag salute instead of reciting the Pledge of Allegiance).
146. See Mickey Lee Jett, Note, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of
Tinker in the Age of Digital Social Media, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 895, 916-17 (2012); David
L. Hudson, Jr., Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First Amendment
Law, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 125, 136 (2011) [hereinafter Hudson, Jr., Pearson v.
Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First Amendment Law].
147. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 353.
148. Hudson, Jr., Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First
Amendment Law, supra note 146, at 136.
149. Id.
150. David L. Hudson, Jr., 4th Amendment Ruling Could Influence First Amendment
Law, FREEDOM F. INST. (Jan. 27, 2009), [https://perma.cc/MXW6-TPXE].
151. 393 U.S. 503, 512-14 (1969).
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Supreme Court ruled that a public school district could not
prohibit students from wearing black armbands at school in
protest of the Vietnam War.152 The Court also announced that
student speech should only be prohibited if it threatens a
“substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities . . . .”153
After the Tinker decision, the Court carved out three
exceptions to the Tinker doctrine.154 The first exception applies
to “offensively lewd and indecent speech.”155 The Court held that
public schools may prohibit this type of speech because it “would
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”156 The
second exception includes student newspapers and other schoolsponsored speech.157 The Court determined that “school officials
were entitled to regulate the contents of [the newspaper] in any
reasonable manner” when “students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive [it] to bear the imprimatur of
the school.”158
The last exception is in the Court’s second most recent
student speech decision, Morse v. Frederick, in which the Court
took a significant step away from the traditional Tinker standard
but did not abandon it altogether.159 In that case, a school
principal suspended a student for displaying a banner with the
phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”160 Chief Justice Robert’s
majority held that the principal did not violate the student’s First
Amendment rights because the principal interpreted the banner to
advocate for illegal drug use.161 The Court recognized that
“deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed,
perhaps compelling’ interest” and that “[t]he First Amendment
does not require schools to tolerate at school events student
152. Id. at 510-11.
153. Id. at 512-14.
154. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
155. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
156. Id.
157. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73.
158. Id. at 270-71.
159. 551 U.S. 393, 408-10 (2007).
160. Id. at 397-98.
161. Id. at 402.
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expression that contributes to” the dangers of student drug use,
thus creating the third exception to the Tinker standard.162
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in part and dissent in part in
Morse would not have undertaken this analysis under the First
Amendment.163 Instead, Justice Breyer would have held that
qualified immunity protected the principal in this case because
“she did not clearly violate the law during her confrontation with
the student.”164 The majority suggested it did not decide the case
based on qualified immunity because the principal asked for
declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages (and
qualified immunity is only available as a defense in cases
requesting money damages).165 However, Justice Breyer’s
approach of avoiding the constitutional question in favor of
finding that the principal was entitled to qualified immunity
because there was no “clearly established” right is precisely the
problem that the qualified immunity doctrine poses.166 Without
negotiating the highly discretionary qualified immunity analysis,
courts could rely solely on Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse
to evaluate students’ Section 1983 claims for violations of their
First Amendment rights, and the law in these areas would become
clearer.
Although the outcome in Morse would likely have been the
same with or without a qualified immunity analysis, lower court
opinions have demonstrated that qualified immunity is
unnecessary in cases involving Section 1983 claims for First
Amendment violations.167 Lower courts tend to rely on Tinker’s
162. Id. at 407, 408, 410 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661
(1995)).
163. Id. at 425 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Morse, 551 U.S. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 400 n.1 (majority opinion).
166. Id. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hudson, Jr.,
Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First Amendment Law, supra note
146, at 136.
167. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 338-39 (2d Cir. 2011) (school
administrators entitled to qualified immunity when student brought claim for violation of her
First Amendment free speech rights after preventing her from running for student
government because of her off-campus speech and prohibiting her from wearing a
homemade printed t-shirt at a school assembly); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 364-65
(5th Cir. 2011) (principal entitled to qualified immunity when student brought a claim for
violation of her First Amendment rights after he restricted her from distributing religious
materials outside of school hours to a group of students); C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano
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“substantial disruption” standard when analyzing students’
claims for violations of their First Amendment free speech rights
“unless the speech is lewd, advocates drug use, or bears the
school’s imprimatur.”168
For example, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit
granted qualified immunity to a principal and a superintendent of
a school after they prohibited a student from running for class
secretary and from wearing a homemade printed shirt stating
“Team Avery” to a school assembly based on the student’s offcampus speech calling the school administrators “douchebags”
and urging other students to take action “to piss [them] off
more.”169 Under the Tinker analysis, the court held “it was
objectively reasonable for school officials to conclude that [the
student]’s behavior was potentially disruptive of student
government functions . . .” and thus, the student did not have a
clearly established right “not to be prohibited from participating
in a voluntary, extracurricular activity because of offensive offcampus speech . . . .”170 Despite the student’s reliance on a
Supreme Court case in which “public school students were
punished for publishing and distributing to their peers a lewd,
satirical newspaper” off campus, the court found that this did not
create a “clearly established” right despite the substantial factual
similarities in the cases.171 If the school administrators had been
unable to raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, the
student would have had a greater chance to prevail because the
Second Circuit would have had more freedom to compare prior

Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2011) (teacher entitled to qualified immunity
after student claimed teacher violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
when teacher made statements hostile to religion while discussing creationism in history
class). But see Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004)
(teacher and principal not entitled to qualified immunity when student brought claim for
violation of his First Amendment free speech rights after school officials paddled student for
raising his fist during a daily flag salute instead of reciting the Pledge of Allegiance).
168. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); Lee
Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA.
L. REV. 395, 404 (2011).
169. 642 F.3d at 340-41, 351, 356.
170. Id. at 346, 351 (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (D. Conn.
2009)).
171. Id. at 346.
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cases with similar facts to the case at issue when applying the
Tinker standard.
The previous example also demonstrates the discretion the
Tinker standard affords to school personnel in determining
whether to limit particular student speech.172 The standard
“requires courts to defer to educators’ reasonable determinations
of what speech may cause a substantial disruption . . . .”173 This
is exactly the type of deference that the Supreme Court was trying
to protect in Wood when they extended qualified immunity to
protect school officials.174 The Tinker standard and the three
other exceptions to protect student speech are also sufficiently
clear to provide officials with “fair warning” about what conduct
is unlawful when dealing with student speech issues.175
Therefore, qualified immunity is unnecessary and may actually
present additional challenges to students bringing Section 1983
claims for First Amendment violations.176
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ABOLISHING QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
The biggest challenge to abolishing qualified immunity in
K-12 schools and simply relying on existing legal standards to
evaluate students’ Section 1983 claims is that scholars argue that
these standards are unclear and thus do not provide school
officials with “fair warning”177 that their conduct is unlawful.178
Regarding Fourth Amendment claims for unreasonable searches,
David Blickenstaff argues that the T.L.O. standard is “too lenient
172. See Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student
Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1282, 1282 (2008).
173. Id.
174. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975).
175. See Joe Dryden, It’s a Matter of Life and Death: Judicial Support for School
Authority Over Off-Campus Student Cyber Bullying and Harassment, 33 U. LA VERNE L.
REV. 171, 182-88 (2012); Goldman, supra note 168, at 405; Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
739-41 (2002).
176. See Hudson, Jr., Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First
Amendment Law, supra note 146, at 136-39.
177. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-41.
178. See Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 41 (arguing that the T.L.O. standard to evaluate
strip searches of students is unclear); Jett, supra note 146, at 897-98, 918-19 (arguing that
the Tinker standard is unclear as applied to student speech cases).
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and too ill-defined” to apply to strip searches of students at
school.179 However, Justices Stevens’s and Ginsburg’s dissents
in Redding demonstrate why this view is incorrect.180 They
opined that there is disagreement about the T.L.O. standard not
because the T.L.O test is ambiguous but rather because lower
courts misapply the standard.181 Therefore, if lower courts were
to apply the T.L.O. test correctly, school officials would have “fair
warning” about what is and is not permissible behavior when
conducting student searches because the standard is sufficiently
clear to provide that notice.182
Regarding First Amendment claims, a common critique of
the Tinker standard is that it is unclear how it applies in student
speech cases, particularly regarding online or off-campus student
speech.183 Allison Belnap notes that the Tinker standard is
ambiguous because it is uncertain whether a school needs to show
“specific and concrete evidence” that previous similar speech has
“resulted in a material and substantial interference with school
operations,” “a well-founded belief that the disruption will occur,”
or “merely a foreseeable risk that the speech would result in a
material and substantial disruption . . . .”184 Another scholar
notes that lower courts have applied Tinker differently and
reached different results in online school speech cases because of
“the difficulty in applying traditional school-speech
jurisprudence to cyberspeech.”185
However, these arguments highlight the fact that lower
courts are misapplying the Supreme Court’s precedent in Tinker
rather than the standard’s ambiguity.186 Professor Dryden notes
that lower courts run into trouble when they only apply one of
Tinker’s prongs rather than both.187 If courts applied both prongs
179. Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 47.
180. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 380-82 (2009).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 114-19.
182. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.
183. See generally Jett, supra note 146; Allison Belnap, Comment, Tinker at a
Breaking Point: Why the Specter of Cyberbullying Cannot Excuse Impermissible Public
School Regulation of Off-Campus Student Speech, 2011 BYU L. REV. 501, 509 (2011).
184. Belnap, supra note 183, at 523-24.
185. Jett, supra note 146, at 897.
186. See Dryden, supra note 175, at 182-88; Goldman, supra note 168, at 405.
187. Dryden, supra note 175, at 215-16.
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of the Tinker standard in analyzing students’ claims for First
Amendment violations:
[S]chool officials would not be permitted to proscribe any
speech . . . unless they could articulate objective facts which
would demonstrate that the expression created, or was likely
to create, a substantial disruption of school operations or the
expression interfered with the rights of others on more than
just a temporary and superficial level.188

This hearkens back to Justice Stevens’s comment in Redding
that “the clarity of a well-established right should not depend on
whether jurists have misread [the Supreme Court’s]
precedents.”189 In other words, if applied correctly, the Tinker
standard is sufficiently clear to put school officials on notice of
what kinds of conduct are and are not permissible when dealing
with student speech issues.
Relying on T.L.O., the highly deferential “shocks-theconscience” test, and Tinker and its progeny for analyzing
students’ Section 1983 claims will still provide school officials
notice of conduct that is unconstitutional in discharging their
duties without the need for qualified immunity. The Supreme
Court has stated that “officials can still be on notice that their
conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances.”190 The standards under which courts analyze
students’ First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims are
sufficiently clear to provide school officials with “fair warning”
of what conduct is and is not permissible.191 Further, the
argument that qualified immunity is designed to allow public
officials, particularly law enforcement officers, to make splitsecond decisions is not as pressing in the K-12 context.192 It is
much more likely that teachers and school administrators have
time to consult attorneys, supervisors, and co-workers about a

188. Id. at 215.
189. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 380 (2009) (Stephens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
191. Id.
192. See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 671 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(“Officers assigned to protect public officials must make singularly swift, on the spot,
decisions whether the safety of the person they are guarding is in jeopardy.”).
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particular method they intend to use to discipline students or
prevent distractions in the learning environment.
Even if these standards are not sufficiently clear to provide
school officials with notice about the lawfulness of their conduct,
it has been noted that public officials “do not pause in the course
of conduct to ponder whether their behavior violates the
Constitution and can therefore subject them to federal liability
. . . .”193 Therefore, there is an argument that “providing [public
officials] with legal or constitutional notice is of little practical
use” because state actors do not consider “federal forum[s] or
attorney’s fees” when deciding how to handle a particular
situation.194 Instead, public officials, “like most people, make
decisions based on their conceptions of right and wrong,
buttressed perhaps by a rough sense of the law.”195 When viewed
in this light, qualified immunity may not be necessary to provide
notice to school officials about lawful and unlawful conduct
because these officials do not rely on specific articulations of the
law when making decisions in the classroom.
Students will also receive more expansive constitutional
protections if the Supreme Court abolishes qualified immunity in
the K-12 context. According to the Wood Court:
The imposition of monetary costs for mistakes which were
not unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances would
undoubtedly deter even the most conscientious school
decisionmaker from exercising his judgment independently,
forcefully, and in a manner best serving the long-term
interest of the school and the students.196

Thus, qualified immunity in the school setting serves to
protect teachers and other school officials from costly litigation
by allowing them to exercise discretion in their day-to-day
duties.197 However, the legal standards previously discussed
provide that same level of protection of school officials’
discretion.198
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Heller, supra note 86, at 317.
Id. at 354.
Id.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975).
See id.
See supra Part III.
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Rejecting qualified immunity for school officials would not
affect any other protections the law has already afforded to school
personnel, such as the law’s refusal to recognize any duty to
protect or supervise students.199 Some cases have applied
qualified immunity in cases alleging a failure to protect or
supervise students, and these cases usually result in awarding
qualified immunity to the school officials.200 For example, in
Mann v. Palmerton Area School District, a student brought suit
against his football coach under a failure to protect theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment after the student suffered a traumatic
brain injury when the coach knew the student sustained multiple
hard hits in practice and failed to implement the policies required
when a student suffered a head injury.201 The court held that the
football coach was entitled to qualified immunity because “it was
not so plainly obvious that requiring a student-athlete, fully
clothed in protective gear, to continue to participate in practice
after sustaining a violent hit and exhibiting concussion symptoms
implicated the student athlete’s constitutional rights.”202 The
Third Circuit repeatedly emphasized the fact that although there
were other cases involving student-athletes and coaches brought
under Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claims, none of
the facts of those cases was similar enough to create a “clearly
established” right.203 However, without having to undertake a
qualified immunity analysis, the court would have been allowed
to rely more heavily on the other cases, and thus may have
allowed the student to prevail on his claim for a constitutional
violation.
Further, abolishing qualified immunity for school officials
would not affect the protections that the stringent Monell standard
199. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97
(1989).
200. See, e.g., Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2017)
(student claimed high-school football coach violated student’s substantive Due Process
rights when student received a traumatic brain injury after coach required the student to
participate in practice after student received a violent hit and coach observed concussion
symptoms); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1995) (superintendent
entitled to qualified immunity after a classmate sexually assaulted the student because the
court found no special relationship existed that would create a duty to protect).
201. 872 F.3d at 169-70.
202. Id. at 174.
203. Id. at 173-74.
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provides to school districts and school officials.204 School
districts often indemnify teachers and other school administrators
when students bring claims under Section 1983.205 If a school
district or school board indemnifies a school official, another
avenue for students to bring Section 1983 claims is against a
school district or school board under Monell, which requires that
(1) a state actor “violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights” and
(2) the municipal entity be responsible for the violation because
of the entity’s policies, practices, or customs.206 Therefore, even
with the availability of qualified immunity, teachers are rarely
responsible for the financial burden that comes from Section 1983
liability. Even without qualified immunity, this framework would
preserve the doctrine’s goal of protecting public officials from
financial liability.207
The strict “deliberate indifference”
requirement under Monell also serves to protect school districts
from financial liability, meaning that eliminating qualified
immunity in the K-12 context would not lead to more successful
suits against school districts if suits brought against individual
school officials fail.208
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should abolish qualified immunity in
favor of relying on existing legal standards when analyzing
Section 1983 claims against school officials for violating
students’ constitutional rights. The modern application of the
doctrine fails to protect students from constitutional violations
because it requires too strict a reliance on cases with substantially
similar facts. The T.L.O. standard for Fourth Amendment claims,
204. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Stoneking v.
Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724-25, 729-30 (3d Cir. 1989).
205. 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 460 (2021).
206. Weatherby, supra note 55, at 160-61.
207. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (noting that “the expenses of
litigation” is one of qualified immunity’s protections afforded to public officials).
208. See Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725. This is important because one way that school
districts receive the money they could use to pay damages, court costs, and attorneys’ fees is
from taxes levied against the communities in which they operate. See Public School Revenue
Sources, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., [https://perma.cc/J57T-FRKZ] (May 2021). Thus,
Monell’s strict standard protects school districts, the school officials these districts may
indemnify, and the families of students who attend those school districts.

5 SMITH.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/22 3:24 PM

838

Vol. 74:4

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

the “shocks-the-conscience” standard for Fourteenth Amendment
claims, and the Tinker standard for First Amendment claims more
effectively balance students’ interests and the need for adequate
notice about what constitutes unlawful conduct. These tests will
also preserve discretion for school officials to perform their job
duties effectively. Further, eliminating qualified immunity in
cases against school officials would not leave them entirely
unprotected from students’ Section 1983 claims.
Qualified immunity is not only a problem in K-12 schools.209
For years, scholars have noted the serious problems the doctrine
poses, especially in excessive force claims asserted against law
enforcement.210 After the tragic death of George Floyd in May
2020 while in police custody,211 many critics renewed the call for
a repeal of qualified immunity, especially in the law enforcement
context.212 The U.S. House of Representatives even passed a bill
entitled the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, which
would amend Section 1983 to state that qualified immunity can
no longer be a defense for law enforcement officers.213 However,
not everyone is on board with the idea of abolishing qualified
immunity.214 Considering the Supreme Court’s reluctance to

209. Courts’ applications of qualified immunity are problematic in all areas, not just
K-12 public schools. However, it is important to focus on qualified immunity in the school
context because schools are charged with the important task of “educating the young for
citizenship[, which] is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
210. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 70, at 17981800; Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 49, at 6-7, 22; John P. Gross,
Qualified Immunity and the Use of Force: Making the Reckless into the Reasonable, 8 ALA.
C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 67, 67 (2017).
211. See Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2021, 9:48 AM), [https://perma.cc/8BR5-36XX].
212. See John Kramer, George Floyd and Beyond: How “Qualified Immunity”
Enables Bad Policing, INST. FOR JUST. (June 3, 2020), [https://perma.cc/AY7K-MYM3];
Tyler Olsen, George Floyd Case Revives ‘Qualified Immunity’ Debate, as Supreme Court
Could Soon Take Up Issue, FOX NEWS (May 29, 2020), [https://perma.cc/N7TX-EJL5].
213. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102
(2021). As of April 19, 2021, only the U.S. House of Representative has passed this bill.
214. See Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, supra note 92, at 315 & nn.18-19
(describing the Supreme Court and other scholars’ “strongest defenses of qualified
immunity”).
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address the issue for police officers, it may be a while before there
is any further progress in the movement to abolish the doctrine.215
The next time the Court addresses the issue, however, it may
be more feasible to start in the K-12 public school context than in
the law enforcement context. School officials are not often faced
with situations in which they must make life or death decisions as
law enforcement officers are.216 Abolishing qualified immunity
for K-12 school officials could be a starting point for the Court to
see how public officials may react to not having the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity in their back pockets when making
decisions within the scope of their employment.
Ultimately, regardless of how abolishing qualified immunity
in the K-12 context may affect other public actors, the Supreme
Court must take a hard look at how the doctrine protects egregious
conduct by school officials and prevents students from bringing
successful Section 1983 claims. Students do not and should not
“shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”217
Courts’ modern applications of qualified immunity in K-12
school cases dilute this sentiment and leave students and their
families without a legal remedy in the face of more and more
violations of their constitutional rights.

215. See Andrew Chung, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Case Over ‘Qualified Immunity’
For Police, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2021, 8:48 AM), [https://perma.cc/57U9-CAFM].
216. See supra text accompanying notes 190-93; see also Justin Driver, Schooling
Qualified Immunity, EDUC. NEXT, [https://perma.cc/6M3Q-PY4J] (Mar. 23, 2021) (“The
teacher’s paddle is . . . a far cry from the officer’s gun.”).
217. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).

